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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper reports the results of two experiments designed to test predictions from the 
mood-as-input hypothesis about the factors that contribute to the ending of a worry 
bout. Experiment 1 looked at changes in self-reported mood across a catastrophising 
interview task. Experiment 2 investigated whether there were any changes in stop rule 
deployment between the beginning and end of a catastrophising interview task. 
Experiment 1 demonstrated that worriers tended to show increases in negative mood 
and decreases in positive mood over the course of catastrophising. In Experiment 2, 
participants exhibited a significant shift away from endorsing the use of ‘as many as can’ 
stop rules and a significant increasing tendency to endorse the use of ‘feel like 
continuing’ stop rules over the course of catastrophising. These results suggest that 
worriers exhibit increases in negative mood across the worry bout, but shift from the use 
of ‘as many as can’ to ‘feel like continuing’ stop rules. Mood-as-input hypothesis predicts 
that if high worriers ask the question “do I feel like continuing?” in the context of 
increasing negative mood, this will imply that the activity is no longer enjoyable or 
profitable and should be terminated. The results are discussed in the context of mood-as-
input accounts of pathological worrying and the therapeutic implications of these 
findings are reviewed. 
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 Chronic worry is known to be a feature associated with most of the anxiety 
disorders and most specifically with Generalized Anxiety Disorder (GAD) (Brown, 
Antony & Barlow, 1992). In particular, since the advent of Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders (third edition; DSM-III; American Psychiatric Association, 
1980), worrying has been the central diagnostic feature of GAD.  According to the most 
recent diagnostic categorization, the cardinal diagnostic feature of GAD is “excessive 
anxiety and worry (apprehensive expectation)….which the individual finds difficult to 
control” (DSM-IV-TR, APA, 2000, p476). 
One form in which uncontrollable worrying occurs in individuals suffering GAD 
is through processes of catastrophising (Vasey & Borkovec, 1992; Davey & Levy, 1998; 
Breitholtz, Westling & Ost, 1998). Catastrophising is the tendency of individuals to apply 
a ‘what if…?’ questioning style to potential problematic features of their life.  Rather than 
bringing the problem to a satisfactory close, however, this process usually leads the 
worrier to perseverate at the task and to perceive progressively worse and worse 
outcomes to the worry topic (Vasey & Borkovec, 1992; Kendall & Ingram, 1987; Davey 
& Levy, 1998).  Using the cognitive therapy technique of decatastrophising (Kendall & 
Ingram, 1987), Vasey & Borkovec (1992) found that chronic worriers generated 
significantly more catastrophising steps than nonworriers and reported a significant 
increase in subjective discomfort as catastrophising progressed.  Worriers also rated the 
events in the catastrophising sequences as significantly more likely to occur than did 
nonworriers.       
Of particular theoretical importance to an understanding of perseverative 
anxiety-based disorders such as GAD is the need to understand the cognitive processes 
that lead the worrier to persist in generating catastrophising steps when the nonworrier 
will abandon this process at a significantly earlier stage. One theory that has been applied 
to this question is the mood-as-input hypothesis (Startup & Davey, 2001; Davey, 2006). 
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This type of account can be explained by describing a study by Martin et al. (1993).  They 
induced either positive or negative moods in their participants and then asked them to 
generate a list of birds’ names (an item generation task).  Half of the participants were 
asked to stop the task when they no longer felt like doing it (a “feel like continuing” stop 
rule, FL), whereas the other half were asked to stop when they thought they had 
generated as many birds’ names as they could (an “as many as can” stop rule, AMA).  
Martin et al. found that the effect of mood was dependent on the stop rule that 
participants had been asked to use. For the “feel like continuing” stop rule, participants 
in the positive mood persisted at the task for significantly longer than those in the 
negative mood.  However, participants using the “as many as can” stop rule persevered 
for significantly longer when they were in a negative mood.  Martin et al. (1993) 
interpreted these findings in mood-as-input terms where participants interpret their 
mood in relation to the stop rule.  In the “feel like continuing” condition, their negative 
mood tells them to stop.  In the “as many as can” condition, their negative mood tells 
them they are not satisfied with the number of items they have generated, and so should 
persist at the task for longer. 
The mood-as-input account suggests that the worrier’s negative mood interacts 
with the ‘stop rules’ that the worrier brings to the worry task to determine perseveration 
at that task. For instance, worrying is an open-ended task that has no obvious or clear 
end point. This being the case, individuals commencing a worry bout will usually bring 
their own set of implicit stop rules to the task, and the individual will have to make some 
decisions during the course of the worry episode about whether to continue or to stop 
(depending on whether they feel their criteria for stopping have been met).  When 
applied to catastrophic worrying, the mood-as-input hypothesis assumes that worriers are 
in a significantly more negative mood state than nonworriers, and that they use relatively 
stringent ‘as many as can’ stop rules for judging whether to terminate the catastrophising 
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task (cf. Startup & Davey, 2001; Davey, Field & Startup, 2003).  Thus, when 
catastrophising, worriers are continually asking themselves (either implicitly or explicitly) 
whether they have successfully dealt with the problem, but their negative mood provides 
them with information that they have not and this results in perseveration at the task. 
Facts that are consistent with the  mood-as-input account of catastrophic 
worrying are (1) worriers are usually in a significantly more negative mood than 
nonworriers when they commence a worry bout (Vasey & Borkovec, 1992), (2) worriers  
experience endemic negative mood which is normally at significantly higher levels than is 
experienced by nonworriers (Davey, Hampton, Farrell & Davidson, 1992; Meyer, Miller, 
Metzger & Borkovec, 1990; Metzger, Miller, Chen, Sofka & Borkovec, 1990), and this 
negative mood will often manifest itself as higher levels of both anxiety and depression, 
(3) ‘ as many as can’ stop rules are usually deployed by chronic worriers prior to a 
catastrophising episode (Startup & Davey, 2003), they appear to be related to beliefs 
about the important functions that the worry process serves (Davey, Tallis & Capuzzo, 
1996), and their reported usage is associated with perseveration on a catastrophising task. 
(Davey, Startup, MacDonald, Jenkins & Patterson, 2005). 
While the mood-as-input hypothesis seems able to explain the perseveration of 
worry bouts in worriers, it is still the case that worriers do eventually terminate their 
worry bout. So what factors contribute to this termination? Since negative mood 
combined with deployment of an ‘as many as can’ stop rule drives perseveration, how 
might mood-as-input hypothesis explain the fact that worriers do stop eventually? Mood-
as-input theory makes two predictions in this respect: (1) worriers will either change their 
mood from negative to positive during the course of the worry bout, so that the positive 
mood now provides information implying that the worrier has completed the task 
successfully and can finish, or (2) worriers will change their stop rules (but not their 
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negative mood) from ‘as many as can’ to ‘feel like’ so that the negative mood now implies 
that the worrier ‘does not feel like continuing any further’. 
This paper describes two experiments designed to test these predictions from 
mood-as-input hypothesis. Experiment 1 looks at changes in self-reported mood during 
a catastrophising task to determine whether termination of the bout is associated with a 
shift from negative to positive mood.  Experiment 2 investigated whether there were any 
changes in stop rule use during a catastrophing task, and in particular, whether worriers 
shifted from deploying ‘as many as can’ stop rules to ‘feel like continuing’ stop rules 
during the course of the task. Identifying the factors that cause an individual to terminate 
a worry task is not only of theoretical interest, it may also have significant importance for 
interventions designed to help pathological worriers control their worrying. 
 
EXPERIMENT 1 
 
Mood-as-input hypothesis predicts that perseverative worrying will be determined by the 
use of ‘as many as can’ stop rules in the presence of a negative mood. First, there is 
considerable evidence that pathological worriers do commence a worry bout in a mood 
that is significantly more negative than that reported in nonworriers (Startup & Davey, 
2001). Frequent worriers also score significantly higher on trait measures of negative 
mood than low worriers (Davey, Hampton, Farrell & Davidson, 1992; Meyer, Miller, 
Metzger & Borkovec, 1990; Metzger, Miller, Chen, Sofka & Borkovec, 1990). What is 
also interesting in this context is that while worriers commence the worry bout in a 
negative mood, their mood appears to become more negative as catastrophising 
develops. For example, worriers appear to experience more and more emotional 
discomfort as their catastrophising progresses (Vasey & Borkovec, 1992), and this would 
suggest that the increasing levels of negative mood should be interpreted as stronger and 
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stronger evidence to continue worrying. This appears to be contrary to mood-as-input 
predictions because, although worriers appear to have persevered with the bout for 
longer than nonworriers, negative mood is apparently at its strongest at the point when 
the worrier abandons the bout. 
 Experiment 1 is designed to systematically investigate the course of self-reported 
mood across a catastrophising bout. Participants were divided into 3 groups who differed 
on the basis of the stop rule they were asked to use at the outset of catastrophising (‘as 
many as can’, ‘feel like continuing’ or no stop rule). This manipulation was included to 
determine whether the nature of the stop rule deployed at the outset of catastrophising 
had a confounding effect on the course of mood throughout catastrophising. For 
example, adopting ‘as many as can’ stop rules may itself generate negative mood because 
of the need for the participant to systematically process their worry to ensure it is fully 
considered. In contrast, adopting ‘feel like continuing’ stop rules may help the participant 
to avoid stressful worry-based cognitions and disengage from the worry process before 
negative mood increases significantly. 
 
METHOD 
 
Participants 
 
The participants consisted of 60 (50 female and 10 male) undergraduate and postgraduate 
students from the University of Sussex with an age range of 18-61 years and a mean age 
of 25.2 years (SD 8.2 years).  Participants were recruited on a voluntary basis and were 
unaware of the aims and purpose of the study. 
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Procedure 
 
Participants were assigned randomly to one of three groups.  These groups were labeled 
AMA (n = 20), FL (n = 20) and no stop rule (n = 20) depending on the stop rule they 
were to be using.  Participants were tested individually in a small room containing an 
angle-poise lamp and an audiocassette player with headphones.  Participants were 
instructed that they would be required to complete two questionnaires and then partake 
in a short interview.   
 
Stage 1:  All participants were asked to fill in an informed consent form and then asked 
to complete the PSWQ as a measure of trait worry, and the HADS as a measure of trait 
anxiety and depression.  The Penn State Worry Questionnaire (Meyer, Miller, Metzger 
and Borkovec, 1990) is a valid measure of trait worrying that is unaffected by the content 
of the worry (Molina & Borkovec, 1994; Davey, 1993), and the Hospital Anxiety and 
Depression Inventory (HADS; Zigmond & Snaith, 1983) is a valid measure of the 
severity of depressive and anxious symptoms 
 
Stage 2:  Prior to the catastrophising interview, participants were also asked to rate their 
current levels of anxiety, sadness, and happiness on separate visual analogue 100-point 
scales (where 0=not at all anxious/sad/happy and 100=extremely anxious/sad/happy). 
The VAS mood measures asked participants to “..mark a cross along the scale to indicate 
how sad/happy/anxious you feel at the present moment”. Participants who had been 
randomly assigned either the FL or AMA stop rule condition were then presented with 
written and verbal instructions asking them to adopt the required stop rule during the 
catastrophising interview task. Those receiving the FL instruction were told: “As you 
take part in the interview, please ask yourself ‘Do I feel like I want to continue with this 
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interview?’ If the answer is ‘yes’, then continue generating responses. If the answer is 
‘no’, then stop. Stop when you no longer feel like generating responses.” Those receiving 
the AMA instructions were told: “As you take part in the interview please ask yourself 
‘Have I reached the goal of sufficiently exploring my worry?’ If the answer is ‘yes’, then 
stop. If the answer is ‘no’, then continue generating responses. Stop when you have 
sufficiently explored your worry.” 
 
 
Stage 3: Participants were then asked what their main worry was at the current time, and 
this worry was subjected to a catastrophising interview.  The catastrophising interview is 
modeled on that reported by Vasey & Borkovec (1992) and contains the methodological 
refinements introduced by Davey & Levy (1998) and Startup & Davey (2001).  The 
interview begins with the experimenter asking the question “what is it that worries you 
about (X)?”, where X is the participant’s current main worry.  The experimenter then 
repeats this question substituting the participant’s answer to the first question for X.  For 
example, if the individual’s current worry is exams, the first question will be “what is it 
that worries you about exams?”.  If the participant replies “I am worried that I may fail 
them”, the experimenter then asks “what is it that worries you about failing your 
exams?”, if the participant replies “I won’t get a good job”, the experimenter then asks 
“what is it that worries you about not getting a good job?”, and so on.  This standardized 
form of questioning is adopted throughout the catastrophising interview to avoid any 
experimenter bias in the way questions are worded.  The refinements to the procedure 
originally designed by Vasey & Borkovec (1992) were (1) participants were asked to write 
down their response to each catastrophising step on a response sheet, (2) they were 
encouraged to keep each response no longer than a sentence that fitted the appropriate 
space on the response sheet, and (3) at the outset of the catastrophising procedure, all 
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participants were provided with examples of the initial steps in a catastrophising 
sequence, so that they were aware of what was required. In the present study, the 
catastrophising interview was terminated when the participant either admitted they could 
think of no more responses or did not want to continue (although participants are not 
told at the outset that these were the criteria for ending the interview).  The dependent 
variable and measure of perseveration is the number of steps that the participant emits 
before running out of responses and terminating the interview. 
 After every two catastrophising steps all participants were asked to pause from 
the catastrophizing interview and complete the VAS mood measures described in Stage 
2. Participants were also asked to complete these mood measures once more immediately 
after completing the catastrophising interview. 
 
Stage 4: Participants were fully debriefed on the aims and purpose of the study and 
thanked for their participation 
 
RESULTS 
 
Trait measures: The mean PSWQ , HADS Anxiety and HADS Depression scores for 
all participants were 51.48 (SD=11.0), 8.78 (SD=4.0), and 3.48 (SD=2.8) respectively. 
There were no significant differences between the three stop rule groups in scores on 
PSWQ [F(2,59)=1.37, p>.2], HADS Anxiety [F(2,59)=1.63, p>.2] and HADS 
Depression [F(2,59)=0.15, p>.8]. Over all participants PSWQ score was significantly 
correlated with both HADS Anxiety [r(60)=.49, p<.001] and HADS Depression 
[r(60)=.21, p<.05] scores, indicating that high worriers scored higher on both anxiety and 
depression scores. 
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Mood changes across the catastrophising task:  Because the length of the 
catastrophising interview differed across participants, a measure of changes in mood 
across the catastrophising task was calculated by taking a difference score for each of the 
three mood measures. Difference scores were calculated by subtracting the mood score 
at the termination of the task from the mood score at the outset of the task. 
 Difference scores for the sadness measure were significantly correlated with 
PSWQ scores across all participants [r(60) =.23, p<.05] indicating that sad mood 
increased across the catastrophising task as a function of trait worrying as measured by 
the PSWQ – high worriers showed a greater increase in sadness across the task compared 
with low worriers. Similarly, difference scores for the happiness measure were 
significantly inversely correlated with PSWQ scores [r(60) =-.21, p<.05), indicating that 
happy mood decreased across the catastrophising task as a function of PSWQ score – 
high worriers showed a greater decrease in happiness across the task than low worriers. 
There was no significant correlation between PSWQ scores and anxiety difference scores 
[r(60) = .15, p>.1]. There were no significant effects of stop rule group on sadness 
difference scores [F(2,59)=.16, p>.8], anxiety difference scores [F(2,59)=.16, p>.8] or 
happiness difference scores [F(2,59)=.02, p>.9], suggesting that mood changes across the 
catastrophising task were unaffected by the stop rule adopted by the participants. 
 In order to illustrate these changes in mood across the catastrophising task in 
high and low worriers a median split was carried out across all 60 participants on the 
PSWQ to create groups with high or low worry scores. The mean PSWQ score for high 
worriers was 59.48 (SD=6.7, range 51-77) and for low worriers 42.93 (SD=8.02, range 
29-50). Figure 1 shows mood difference scores for the three mood measures as a 
function of stop rule group. This figure illustrates how negative mood tends to increase 
and positive mood tends to decrease across the catastrophising task in high worriers and 
changes less so in low worriers. 
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Catastrophising steps: The mean number of catastrophising steps emitted by the three 
stop rule groups were AMA, mean 6.1 (SD=2.6), FL, mean 8.6 (SD=5.4) and no stop 
rule group, mean 9.7 (SD=3.2). There was a significant difference between groups 
[F(2,59)=4.5, p<.02] in which the no stop rule group emitted more catastrophising steps 
than either the AMA or FL group (Bonferroni pairwise comparisons both ps<.05). 
However, across all participants, the correlations between mood difference scores and 
number of catastrophising steps were all nonsignificant (sadness difference score, 
r[60]=.03, p>.3, anxiety difference score, r[60]=-.04, p>.3, happiness difference score, 
r[60]=-.10, p>.2). When the number of catastrophising steps was entered as a covariate 
into correlations between PSWQ score and mood difference scores, the inverse 
correlation between PSWQ and happiness difference score still remained significant 
(p<.05), but the correlation between PSWQ and sadness difference score became 
nonsignificant. This suggests that the length of the catastrophising process may play 
some role in determining mood changes across the task, but that decreases in happiness 
across the task as a function of PSWQ score are still significant even when length of the 
catastrophising bout is taken into account. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
Experiment 1 reports increases in negative mood and decreases in positive mood across 
the catastrophising task as a function of trait worry scores (as measured by the PSWQ). 
That is, the more an individual can be categorized as a ‘high worrier’, the more likely they 
are to exhibit increases in negative mood and decreases in positive mood across the 
catastrophising task (see Figure 1). These findings are very similar to those reported by 
Vasey & Borkovec (1992) who found a significant increase in subjective discomfort 
 13 
across a worry task in those participants labeled as chronic worriers. In the present study, 
this effect appeared to be independent of the nature of the stop rule that participants 
were asked to deploy also had no significant effect on mood changes during 
catastrophising. 
 Interestingly, levels of sad mood showed an increase across the catastrophising 
task and not anxious mood. A study by Davey & Levy (1998) may cast some light on 
this. Using independent raters to rate the content of worry topics and the content of 
steps in the catastrophising procedure, Davey & Levy (1998) found that, when compared 
to nonworriers, (1) worriers tended to couch their worries in terms of personal 
inadequacies, and (2) personal inadequacy became a feature of the catastrophising 
sequence regardless of the topic being catastrophised (Davey & Levy, 1998, Studies 5 & 
6). So, as the catastrophising of a worrier progresses, individual steps within the sequence 
come to relate more and more to themes of personal inadequacy and personal failure 
(e.g. “I am worried about being a failure”, “I am worried that I will lose all my friends”, 
etc.), and these themes are likely to evoke feelings of sadness at loss and failure, and 
contribute significantly to the increase in sad mood. 
 This study found no evidence that worriers change their mood during 
catastrophising from negative to positive. In fact, the general finding was a shift to more 
negative and less happy mood over the course of the task. One way that mood-as-input 
hypothesis predicts that a worry bout will be terminated is if the worrier changes their 
mood from negative to positive while deploying an ‘as many as can’ stop rule. Clearly, 
the present findings do not support this prediction. 
 Given that worriers tend to exhibit even higher levels of negative mood after 
terminating their worry bout than they did at the beginning, then another alternative 
possibility is that worriers do not change their mood during the course of a worry bout, 
but change their stop rule from ‘as many as can’ to ‘feel like’. In the context of a stop rule 
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which asks ‘do I feel like continuing’, high levels of negative mood would indicate ‘no’ 
and lead to the worrier stopping. Experiment 2 looks at this possibility by monitoring 
changes in stop rule use across the catastrophising task in high and low worriers. 
 
EXPERIMENT 2 
 
 There is good evidence from a number of different sources to suggest that 
pathological worriers do indeed deploy strict ‘as many as can’ stop rules at the outset of a 
worry bout. For example, both pathological worriers and individuals diagnosed with 
GAD hold strong beliefs that worrying is a necessary process that must be undertaken 
fully and properly in order to avoid future catastrophes (Breitholtz, Westling & Ost, 
1998; Davey, Tallis & Capuzzo, 1996; Wells, 1995; Borkovec & Roemer, 1995; Borkovec, 
Hazlett-Stevens & Diaz, 1999); they also possess elevated evidence requirements for 
decision making (Tallis, Eysenck & Mathews, 1991) that would indicate that they should 
explore all possibilities before terminating a worry bout. In addition, trait worry measures 
have been shown to be related to measures of perfectionism (Pratt, Tallis & Eysenck, 
1997; Frost, Lahart & Rosenblate, 1990), feelings of responsibility for negative outcomes 
(Wells & Papageorgiou, 1998), intolerance of uncertainty (Dugas, Freeston & 
Lladouceur, 1997; Ladouceur, Talbot & Dugas, 1997), and inflated concerns over 
mistakes (Stober & Joorman, 2001). All of these dispositional attributes are ones that 
would indicate that worriers would be driven to deploy ‘as many as can’ stop rules at the 
outset of worrying in order to ensure that their worrying will meet the rather important 
goals that worriers require of it. 
 In a study designed to investigate the type of stop rule used by worriers, Davey, 
Startup, MacDonald, Jenkins & Patterson (2005) found that (1) scores on a checklist 
designed to measure deployment of ‘as many as can’ stop rules were highly correlated 
 15 
with a variety of worry-relevant variables, including measures of trait worry (PSWQ) and 
beliefs about both the positive and negative consequences of worrying (as measured by 
the Consequences of Worry Scale – Davey, Tallis & Capuzzo, 1996); scores on the ‘feel 
like continuing’ sub-scale were unrelated to any worry measures, and (2) the reported use 
of ‘as many as can’ stop rules was significantly related to perseveration in a worry 
catastrophising task (as measured by the number of catastrophising steps emitted in a 
catastrophising interview procedure). These findings suggest that worriers (as defined by 
high scores on the PSWQ) deploy ‘as many as can’ rather than ‘feel like continuing’ stop 
rules prior to a worry bout, and this tendency increases with higher scores on the PSWQ. 
 These findings suggest that worriers do commence worry bouts deploying ‘as 
many as can’ stop rules, and do so more strictly than nonworriers. Experiment 2 is 
designed to examine whether the extent to which worriers use either ‘as many as can’ or 
feel like continuing’ stop rules changes over the course of a catastrophising task. Given 
that the mood of worriers appears to get worse over the course of a worry bout 
(Experiment 1), then mood-as-input hypothesis would predict that termination of the 
bout would require worriers to change their stop rule from ‘as many as can’ to feel like 
continuing’. 
 
METHOD 
 
Participants 
 
The participants consisted of 49 (30 female and 19 male) undergraduate and postgraduate 
students from the University of Sussex with an age range of 18-37 years and a mean age 
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of 24.1 years.  Participants were recruited on a voluntary basis and were unaware of the 
aims and purpose of the study. 
 
Procedure 
 
Participants were tested individually in a small room containing an angle-poise lamp and 
an audiocassette player with headphones.  Participants were instructed that they would be 
required to complete two questionnaires and then partake in a short interview.  The 
procedure was divided into five stages. 
 
Stage 1: After completing an informed consent form, all participants were then asked to 
complete the PSWQ (as a measure of trait worry), the HADS (as a measure of trait 
anxiety and depression), and the Worry Stop Rule Checklist (Kato, MacDonald & Davey, 
unpublished). The Worry Stop Rule Checklist consists of 19 statements that represent 
the thoughts people have when they are deciding whether to continue or stop worrying. 
It contains two sub-scales: An ‘as many as can’ sub-scale (10 items) (example items 
include “I must find a solution to this problem, so keep thinking about it”, “I must try 
and think about the worst possible outcome, just in case it happens”), and a ‘feel like 
continuing sub-scale (9 items) (example items include “Don’t worry about it, things will 
get better”, “This may never happen so forget about it”). The Worry Stop Rule Checklist 
was devised by factor analysis, and the ‘as many as can’ and ‘feel like continuing’ sub-
scales have been shown to have good internal reliability (Cronbach’s α= .88 and .83 
respectively). 
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Stage 2: Prior to the catastrophising interview, participants were also asked to rate their 
current levels of anxiety, sadness, and happiness on separate visual analogue 100-point 
scales (where 0=not at all anxious/sad/happy and 100=extremely anxious/sad/happy). 
 
Stage 3: Participants were then asked what their main worry was at the current time, and 
then completed a VAS version of the Worry Stop Rule Checklist. This VAS scale 
contained four statements, two taken as representative of ‘as many as can’ and two as 
representative of ‘feel like continuing’ stop rules. Participants were asked to rate how 
well, at this point in time, each of the four statements described their attitude towards the 
worry topic they had nominated at the beginning of Stage 3. Specifically, the participants 
were asked “Listed below are some thoughts that people have while they are worrying. 
Put a cross on the line below each statement in relation to how much eaxh statement 
applies to you at this very moment”. Each item was rated on a 100-point VAS scale. 
 
Stage 4: Participants completed the catastrophising interview described more fully in 
Experiment 1.  After every two catastrophising steps all participants were asked to pause 
from the catastrophizing interview and complete the VAS Worry Stop Rule Checklist 
described in Stage 3.  
 
Stage 5: Participants were again asked to complete the VAS Worry Stop Rule Checklist, 
and were then debriefed and thanked for their participation. 
 
RESULTS 
 
Trait measures: The mean PSWQ , HADS Anxiety and HADS Depression scores for 
all participants were 49.02 (SD=11.3), 7.82 (SD=4.4), and 3.84 (SD=3.1) respectively. 
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Over all participants PSWQ score was significantly correlated with both HADS Anxiety 
[r(49)=.81, p<.001] and HADS Depression [r(49)=.57, p<.001] scores, indicating that 
high worriers scored higher on both anxiety and depression scores. PSWQ scores were 
also significantly correlated with scores on the AMA scale of the Worry Stop Rule 
Checklist [r(49)=.55, p<.001] and inversely correlated with scores on the FL scale 
[r(49)=-.49, p<.001]. 
 
Mood measures at the outset of catastrophising: Immediately prior to commencing 
the catastrophising task, correlations between PSWQ scores and VAS mood measures 
showed that high worriers reported significantly higher levels than low worriers of 
anxiety [r(49)=.70, p<.001] and sadness [r(49)=48, p<.001], and significantly lower levels 
of happiness [r(49)=-.33, p<.01]. 
 
Catastrophising Steps: There was also a significant correlation between PSWQ score 
and the number of catastrophising steps emitted by participants [r(49)=.25, p<.05], 
suggesting that participants with high trait worry scores were more likely to persevere at 
the catastrophising task than those participants with low scores. 
 
Stop Rule changes across the catastrophising task: Changes in reported stop rule use 
were measured by taking the VAS Worry Stop Rule Checklist scores prior to 
catastrophising (in Stage 3) and comparing them with the last VAS Worry Stop Rule 
Checklist scores taken prior to ending the interview. 
 Figure 2 shows these two sets of scores for ‘as many as can’ and ‘feel like 
continuing’ stop rule measures. Pairwise comparisons of VAS AMA scores showed that 
AMA scores were significantly higher at the outset of catastrophising than at the end of 
the catastrophising task [t(48)=2.48, p<.02, r=0.17]. A similar comparison of FL scores 
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showed that FL scores were significantly lower at the outset of catastrophising than at 
the end [t(48)=2.57, p<.02, r=0.14). A comparison of AMA with FL ratings at the outset 
of catastrophising showed that AMA ratings were significantly higher than FL 
[t(48)=3.87, p<.001, r=0.43]. However, at the end of catastrophising AMA and FL 
ratings were not significantly different [t(48)=1.25, p>.2, r=0.15]. 
 In order to assess whether level of trait worrying (as measured by PSWQ) was 
related to changes in stop rule use across the catastrophising task, a stop rule difference 
score was calculated for both VAS AMA and FL measures by subtracting the final VAS 
stop rule rating from the rating at the outset of the task. There were no significant 
correlations between PSWQ scores and either AMA difference scores [r(49)=-.12, p>.2] 
or FL difference scores [r(49)=.10, p>.2], suggesting that changes in stop rule use across 
the task were unrelated to level of trait worrying. Similarly, there were no significant 
correlations between either AMA or FL stop rule difference scores and VAS mood 
measures at the outset of the catastrophising task (all rs <.16, all ps >.2) 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
 The results of Experiment 2 indicate that there is a significant shift away from 
endorsing the use of ‘as many as can’ stop rules over the course of the catastrophising 
task, and a significant increasing tendency to endorse the use of ‘feel like continuing’ stop 
rules. Previous studies have indicated that there are significant differences in the type of 
stop rule deployed by high and low worriers at the outset of a worry bout (Davey, 
Startup, MacDonald, Jenkins & Patterson, 2005), but these are the first findings to 
suggest that individuals involved in a worry task may either increase or decrease their 
tendency to deploy a type of stop rule over the course of a worry bout. Participants 
began the catastrophising task with a significantly greater tendency to endorse the use of 
 20 
‘as many as can’ stop rules than ‘feel like continuing’ stop rules. However, by the end of 
the task there was no significant difference between the endorsement of ‘as many as can’ 
and ‘feel like continuing’. Although these findings suggest that there was no overall 
switch from using ‘as many as can’ to predominantly using ‘feel like continuing’ stop 
rules, the drift away from ‘as many as can’ to ‘feel like continuing’ stop rules was 
significant.  It must also be remembered that only two examples each of AMA and FL 
stop rules were used to measure stop rule use during the task, and it is possible that these 
may not have been fully representative of the changes in stop rule use. 
 The fact that endorsement of  ‘as many as can’ stop rules decrease and 
endorsement of ‘feel like continuing’ stop rules increase makes intuitive sense – especially 
if worriers feel they are unlikely to currently resolve any of the issues they are addressing 
in their worry bout. Increasingly deploying ‘feel like continuing’ stop rules towards the 
end of a worry bout implies that the worrier will be looking round for reasons to 
terminate the bout by asking themselves the question “do I feel like continuing this 
activity?”. If the worrier is experiencing high levels of negative mood, then this can be 
used as evidence that the activity should not be continued.  
 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
 This series of two experiments was designed to address the question of what 
factors might lead a worrier eventually to terminate their worry bout. The mood-as-input 
hypothesis would predict that terminating an open-ended activity such as worrying 
should occur (1) when an ‘as many as can’ stop rule is deployed in the presence of a 
positive mood (indicating that the important goals of the activity have been met), or (2) 
when a ‘feel like continuing’ stop rule is deployed in the presence of a negative mood 
(indicating that the individual is not enjoying the task and should stop). 
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 Experiment 1 indicated that – regardless of the stop rule that they were asked to 
deploy during the catastrophising task – worriers tended to show increases in negative 
mood and decreases in positive mood over the course of catastrophising.  In Experiment 
2, participants engaged in a catastrophising task exhibited a significant shift away from 
endorsing the use of ‘as many as can’ stop rules over the course of the task, and a 
significant increasing tendency to endorse the use of ‘feel like continuing’ stop rules.
 These findings suggest that worriers are likely to terminate their worry bout by 
maintaining (and even increasing) levels of negative mood, but shifting away from the 
use of ‘as many as can’ to ‘feel like continuing’ stop rules during the course of worrying. 
Implicitly asking the question “do I feel like continuing?” in the context of a negative 
mood implies that the activity is no longer enjoyable or profitable and should be 
terminated. 
 First, the fact that worriers show increases in negative mood across the worry 
bout is consistent with the findings of Vasey & Borkovec (1992) who reported increases 
in emotional discomfort in chronic worriers across a catastrophising task. There may be a 
number of reasons for this increase: (1) the worry bouts of worriers may be characterized 
by asking “what if…?” questions to try and elaborate the range of possible negative 
outcomes associated with a worry topic (Kendall & Ingram, 1987), and, once elaborated, 
these negative outcomes may add cumulatively to experienced negative mood, (2) 
chronic worry is associated with poor problem-solving confidence (Davey, 1994a), and 
negative mood may be generated by lack of confidence in any solutions to their worries 
that the worrier has produced during the worry bout, and (3) detailed analysis of the 
catastrophising steps generated by high worriers indicates that personal inadequacies 
become a feature of catastrophising steps later in the catastrophising sequence regardless 
of the worry topic (Davey & Levy, Studies 5 & 6), and the recurrent appearance of these 
themes may evoke feelings of sadness at failure and personal incompetence. 
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 Secondly, individuals participating in a worry task exhibit a shift away from ‘as 
many as can’ to ‘feel like continuing’ stop rules across the catastrophising interview. 
Together with the worrier’s increasing negative mood towards the end of the bout, a 
shift to a ‘feel like continuing’ stop rule would provide a set of circumstances in which 
mood-as-input hypothesis would predict an end to perseveration. However, the shift 
from ‘as many as can’ to ‘feel like continuing’ stop rules during worry begs two questions: 
(1) why the shift in the first place, and (2) what kinds of information might the worrier 
source to answer the question about whether they should continue? There is no obvious 
evidence for why worriers should drift from ‘as many as can’ to feel like continuing’ stop 
rules, but clearly this would be facilitated if worry represents a problem-solving process 
that is continually thwarted by poor problem-solving confidence (Davey, 1994ab). As the 
worrier begins the bout determined to resolve issues (using ‘as many as can’ stop rules), 
their continuing inability to do so may lead to the adoption of an attitude which asks 
‘why am I doing this if I can’t resolve anything?’ (a ‘feel like continuing’ stop rule). Once 
‘feel like continuing’ stop rules have been increasingly deployed towards the end of the 
bout, increasing negative mood is an obvious source of information that would imply 
that the activity should be terminated. For the high worrier, other sources of information 
could also be utilized to answer the question of ‘why continue?’. These include the 
chronic worrier’s lack of belief in their problem-solving ability (Davey, 1994a), and the 
negative self-referent statements that start to intrude into the catastrophising sequence 
(Davey & Levy, 1998). However, it is quite likely that all these factors are interlinked with 
negative mood to provide coherent and integrated information that the task should not 
be continued. 
 While the present studies provide some insight into the cognitive and emotional 
processes that may determine the length of a worry bout, they also identify some of the 
variables that may be important in helping chronic worriers to control their worry bouts. 
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For example, helping chronic worriers to identify the kinds of ‘as many as can’ stop rule 
they deploy at the outset of a worry bout should help them to begin to control the rules 
they use, and to provide insight into how the deployment of ‘as many as can’ stop rules 
in the context of negative mood leads to perseveration. The catastrophising interview 
may also be a valuable therapeutic tool by enabling the therapist to identify those 
negative cognitions that may intrude consistently into the catastrophising process and be 
a source of increasing emotional discomfort. With pathological worriers, this can 
demonstrate that these negative themes intrude across a range of worries, contribute to 
failure to bring closure to the process, and are a source of negative mood. Once 
identified, these themes can be isolated and challenged using more formal cognitive 
therapy methods (Davey, 2006). 
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FIGURE LEGENDS 
 
Figure 1: Mood difference scores (calculated by subtracting the mood score at the 
termination of the task from the mood score at the outset of the task) for all three mood 
measures for ‘high worriers’ (filled bars) and ‘low worriers’ (open bars) in Experiment 1. 
 
Figure 2: Mean stop rule scores (AMA= ‘as many as can’, FL= ‘feel like 
continuing’) taken prior to or at the end of the catastrophising interview task for ‘high 
worriers’ and ‘low worriers’. 
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FIGURE 2 
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